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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HOWARD E. W ATICINS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

YS.

UTAH POULTRY AND FARMERS
COOPERATIVE, a corporation,

7774

Defendant and Respondent.

Appellant's Brief
NATURE OF CASE
This suit was brought by the appellant Howard E.
Watkins against respondent Utah Poultry and Farmers
Cooperative, a corporation, to recover damages for
personal injuries consisting primarily of the loss of an
arm and a leg and brain concussion in a sideswiping
truck accident which occurred at a narrow bridge near the
Lunt Roadside Park on the Buckhorn Flat, in Iron
County, Utah about 7 miles north of Paragonah (Exhibit
T). The jury in the trial court returned a verdict of no
cause of action in favor of the defendant, and the lower
court denied the appellant's motion for new trial; from
that order denying the motion for new trial this appeal
was taken.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff Howard E. Watkins was a young man
28 years of age and married March 23, 1946. He was a
veteran having served in the United States Army Field
Artillery in the South Pacific area for 4lj2 years, during
World War II (R. 52). He attended the Agricultural
College in Logan, Utah for four years, majoring in busi:p.ess administration, and had completed his course except
for two or three quarters (R. 53). He moved to St. George
in 1950, where he was employed as an automobile salesman up until the time of the accident (R. 58). The collision occurred on U. S. Highway 91, about 7 miles north
of Paragonah, Utah on the Buckhorn Flat (Exhibit P).
The oil portion of the highway all across the Buckhorn
Flat varies from 18¥2 to 20 feet in width (R. 36-37); the
shoulder on each side of the oiled portion was about 2
feet wide at the bridge shown on Exhibit G (R. 232); the
bridge shown on Exhibit G was over a dry wash about
15 feet wide and deep enough to bury a car (R. 36). The
accident occurred at night at approximately 10:00 o'clock
P.M. (Exhibit P). The plaintiff testified that he saw the
headlights of the defendant's truck on his side of the highway, (R. 80-81); that the truck appeared to be overlapping his side of the road ; that he got his right wheels
on the shoulder about a foot and a half or two feet when
the bridge loomed up. It was either hit the bridge or go
into the gulley, or try to get back on the road and pass the
truck (R. 60-61). The left front headlight of the plaintiff's Ford collided with the left front corner of the
truck-bed, and the truck ripped through the entire left
2
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side of the plaintiff's Ford, the Ford remaining in contact with the truck bed for the full length of the car
(Exhibits E and F). The only part of the truck that was
really damaged was the extreme corner of the rack (R.
48--U1, Exhibit F). There was no damage to the front
fender or to any of the truck in front of the bed of the
truck (R.49).
Highway Patrolman Ernest Pearce who was at
the scene of the accident, testified that he observed
tire burns on the highway in the vicinity of the
bridge on the evening of the accident. The tire burns began between 10 and 20 feet north of the bridge going
in a northerly direction (R. 32). There was no center line
stripe on the highway at that place. The officer described
the tire burns as starting east of the center line and
swinging across the road and back, and then across the
road again ·with the car coming to rest about 400 feet
from the bridge ( R. 33). On the second turn back to the
point where the car came to rest, the tire burns changed
from just a burn or brake mark to a rim gouge. The rim
gouge, starting at the beginning of the last turn and remaining more or less constant to the point where the Ford
came to rest, appeared to be the path taken by the left
front wheel after the left front tire had been thrown from
the Yehicle (R. 34). The tire was picked up by the witness,
Claude E. Burton, the following morning. The tire was
located on the east side of the road straight across from
the Ford automobile (R. 260). Officer Pearce placed two
ink crosses on Exhibit G to identify the point where he
figured tlw tire burns started. He was unable to see any

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tire burns in line with those indicated on Exhibit G south
of that point (R. 41). The officer also testified that raspberries were sea ttered in all directions, but there was a
definite course of the raspberries pretty well toward the
center of the road about 160 feet south of the bridge (R.
41). Officer Pearce stated that the tire burn represented
the car going forward rather than in a side-slip ..
Theodore Atherly, a witness called on behalf
of the plaintiff, testified that he was at the scene of the
accident before the plaintiff was removed to the hospital;
he observed the markings on the highway about 4 feet
from the center line on the east side and about 10 feet
from the bridge. He identified the ink crosses on Exhibit
G as representing the location of the tire marks he saw
on that night. He traced the marks from the car back
to the point indicated on the exhibit; he saw no other tire
burns of any kind extending south of the point indicated
by the ink crosses (R. 115). The distance between the
left-hand tire burn and the center of the highway was
about 4 feet (R. 116). The witness walked back and forth
from the injured man's automobile to the bridge area.
At the bridge there were a few pieces of boards and some
fruit had been scattered across the highway; the fruit
took a course right down the middle of the highway (R.
117). There were automobile headlights shining on the
area in the vicinity of the bridge almost all the time. The
skid marks were very plain. He recalls definitely noting
in his mind at the time of the accident that the skid marks
started about 10 feet north of the bridge; the tire burns
were wider in some places than at others, which was in4
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dicated where he had crossed the road side-ways (R.
118-1:2:2).
There was a split in authority as to the ong1n of
tire burns between the two highway patrolmen who inYestigated the accident. As formerly stated, Highway
Patrolman Ernest Pearce testified that the crosses indicated on Exhibit G showed the commencement of the tire
burns ; however Officer Simmons on behalf of the
defendant testified that he noticed two gouge marks just
north of the bridge and that the southerly most gouge
mark was approximately 2 feet from the center of the
road on the west side, and about 5 to 7 feet north of the
bridge, and \\·as about 2 inches wide and 3 to 4 inches
ltmg (R. 307). The second gouge mark was longer and
more jagged, and was about 11-h feet north and 6 to 8
inches east of the first gouge mark, and was west of the
center. However, on the night of the impact he considered
the center of the raspberry smear as the point of impact
(R. 314). In his notes of his investigation ,made the night
of the accident (Exhibit N) the officer then showed the
point of impact to be 165 feet south of the bridge and
165 paces from the bridge to the plaintiff's car; yet the
officer at the trial stated that he didn't believe any of the
officers, including himself, thought that the point of impact was the center of the smear (R. 315). The exhibit
originally showed the measurement of 17 feet 10 inches
from the point of impact to the east shoulder, but the
officer corrected it to be 11 feet 10 inches at the trial (R.
318). The officer again made the mistake of 100 feet in his
notl•s of the measurement from the point of supposed
5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

impact to the bridge. On Exhibit N he showed it to be
165 and at the trial he stated it was 65 feet. He took
a measurement of 165 paces from the bridge to the plaintiff's car; he took no measurement whatsoever to the
truck; he took the driver of the truck's word and was
not concerned about the measurement of the truck (R.
321). In his report to the State Highway Patrol, he showed the point of impact to be 700 feet from the Ford automobile; that is from the center of the raspberry smear to
the plaintiff's car (R. 322). The first time it ever occurred
to him that he was 100 feet off in his measurement of the
raspberry smear was the night before the trial. He did
not make any note of gouge marks in his report or in his
original notes (R. 323). The tire burns were still visible
on the surface of the highway about one week following
the accident (R. 326). He identified the tire burns on
Exhibit G and could see no other tire burns extending
south from the point marked by the crosses on the exhibit. Exhibit I showed the tire burns made by the Ford
and was apparently an extension of the tire burns shown
on Exhibit G (R. 327). Exhibit 0 was the original report
of the officer which showed the 65 foot point to be 165 feet
(R. 330). He admitted testifying under oath in his
deposition taken before the trial that he came to an agreement with the other officers that the point of impact was
the center of the raspberry smear, and that was 165 feet
from the bridge; that he measured the distance with a tape
(R. 333). And to further indicate the thoroughness of his
investigation, although there were quite a few people at
the scene of the accident, he took the names of no one (R.
6
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340). Although the only measurements he took had reference to the center of the raspberry smear, the officer
testified at the trial that he didn't believe any of the
officers, including himself, thought that the point of impact was in the center of the smear (R. 315), and this,
notwithstanding his admitted testimony on the deposition
that he agreed with the officers that the center of the
raspberry smear was the probable point of impact.
Sheriff Arthur X elson testifying on behalf of
the defendant stated that he saw what looked like
a fresh gouge in the highway surface (R. 264), but he
could not say whether the gouge mark was made the day
before the accident or not. He did not measure from
the gouge marks, but he estimated that they were two
feet from the center of the highway which was purely a
guess. It is significant that he saw no tire burns at all
connecting the scuff mark up with the tire burns that were
about 4 to 5 feet east of the center line (R. 267). The way
the tracks started between the two tire burns was about
the width of an automobile between the two rear wheels
(R. 270). The sheriff claimed that there were no
gouge marks between the point where the tire burns
started and where the car made its final turn back to
where it came to rest. He thought the tire came off right
near where the first gouge mark was made, but he
didn't know (R. 271-272). He claimed that there was a
piece of rubber imbedded between the tire band rim of the
truck and the truck bed, and the rear wheel of the truck
was scuffed on the east side. The raspberry stain went
over the center of the highway as much as 2 or 3 feet and

7
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extended for a distance of about 60 feet south of the bridge
(R. 278-279). The tire burn started about 4 or 5 feet east
of the gouge marks (R. 285). The presence of these gouge
marks was also testified to by William C. Dalton
who appeared on behalf of defendant. He thought the
gouge marks were just slightly on the west side of the
road. He presumed they were made by the Ford wheel
(R. 252-254).
Testifying in rebuttal on behalf of the plaintiff, the
witness Theodore Atherly stated that he did not
see any tire burns near the center of the highway that
took a course east of the highway before making a turn to
the west. He further stated that he looked in the area between the bridge and where the burns first appeared to
see if there were other tire burns indicated on the pavement, and there were no others. He saw some gouges
there but didn't think they were from the accident. He
further stated that there was nothing there to indicate
a connection between the gouge and the tire burns which
first apeared on the highway (R. 362).
Officer Pearce testified in rebuttal that he was
going up and down the highway with his flashlight,
and that the area around the bridge was fairly well lit
by headlights of cars and flares; that he did not observe
any tire burns which originated at or near the center of
the highway and proceeded in a northeasterly direction
before they made the trip across to the west shoulder (R.
363-364). The burns indicated by the ink crosses on

8
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Exhibit G represent the first indication of tire burns or
marks upm~ the highway that he observed (R. 364).
The witness Glen C. Garfield who was a schoolteacher and a passenger in the defendant's truck testified that the wheels of the truck appeared to be on the very
far edge of the highway (R. 77). He stated that he did not
Sl'e the bridge until they were very close to it although he
was watching down the side of the road (R. 186-187).
He stated that the plaintiff's car was proceeding in a
normal manner as it approached, except for relative apparent speed which was the speed he judged before the
plaintiff's automobile got within a quarter of a mile
(R. 186-187). He stated that the plaintiff's car was
probably travP.ling with its lights on dim when he last
observed it. He stated that the truck was loaded with
about six tons of feed and there were several cases of
raspberries which were being carried in the tool box,
which wa~ located under the left corner; that it was not
quite out to the edge of the body of the truck (R. 181).
He stated that he was not conscious of the truck's applying its brak8s anytime before the impact, and that the
truck did not alter its course at all as plaintiff's car approached prior to the impact but maintained a straight
course down the highway. He stated the truck was not
on the shoulder prior to impact (R. 189-190). He did
not think that at any time prior to impact did the truck's
wheels get over to the right shoulder (R. 191). He stated
that the impact of the collision made little effect on the
forward movement of the truck. It just threw the passenger forward a little, but did not cause the truck to
9
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change its course noticeably (R. 193). This fact is significant in that it indicates the contact of the Ford with the
truck was strictly a sideswipe and confirms the testimony
of the plaintiff to the effect that he just turned slightly
towards the truck in order to miss hitting the bridge. If
he haJ turned sharply into the truck, it is inconceivable
that the truck would have continued to proceed on an unaltered course despite the force of the impact. The witnesse Garfield claimed that the truck stopped about 200
feet after impact and then the truck driver pulled up
again about 300 feet onto the shoulder. When they went
back to the scene of the accident, he saw fragments of
broken boxes in the vicinity of the bridge (R. 195). He
said there was just a trickle of raspberries even with
the bridge, the bulk were down just a distance from the
bridge (R. 196). He also stated that the impact was just
north of the bridge (R. 200-201). By the time the witness
got back to the scene of the accident, there were two carloads of football players from Minnesota who had stopped
and rendered assistance to the plaintiff ( R. 179). Without knowing whether or not the chains had been moved)
he picked up some chains a little bit north of the bridge.
There were cars going back and forth at the time (R.180).
He saw several tools scattered along the highway
(R. 181), and part of the front fender of the Ford car
was stuck in the corner of the truck bed, and a piece of
tire from plaintiff's car was imbedded in the rim of the
truck's rear wheel (R. 182). He said the bulk of the
raspberries were about the bridge and in the center of the
road (R. 183).

10
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It is inh"n'stiug to note that after impact, as the
truck continued to pull ahead, it was trailing raspberries
which overlapped the center of the highway, even though
the truck was ostensibly pulling off the road to stop. It
i~ not altogether unlikely that the gouge mark which the
officers thought may haYe been made by the tire-covered
rim of plaintiff's left wheel were in fact made by the falling of the tools onto the highway or by the passing of
traffic over the chains and the tools before they were removed from the highway. These tools were carried underneath the truck and could have been knocked t.o the west
some distance hy the force of the sideswiping impact, before they actually made contact with the ground.
The truckdriver, Lamar W. lYiatheson testified
that the truck was 23lj2 feet in length and that the bed of
the truck was 94 inches (R. 218); that as he approached
the bridge his speed was between 45 and 50 miles per
hour (R. 220); that the plaintiff's lights were not blinding
him, and when he first saw the plaintiff's car it was approximately two miles away, and he thought the car would
clear his cab (R. 221). The truck was in close vicinity of
the bridge abutment when the impact occurred. He
claimed that the truck was at no time east of the center
of the highway in the immediate vicinity of the bridge; he
removed tools from the highway which were lying west of
the center line. The tool box had been broken into pieces
(R. 223-224). He stated that his lights were on low beam
just before the accident (R. 225). He first saw the car
about two miles away, and it appeared to be coming in a
normal manner, and there was no indication that the Ford
11
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was weaving at all on the highway; it was coming straight
(R. 228). Just a moment before the impact, the Ford did
actually turn toward him (R. 229). Although the Ford
did turn toward him, he did not alter his course other than
the road required. At no time prior to the impact did he
alter the straightforward course of his truck except as it
followed the contour of the road, and there were no curves
in the road between the roadside park and the bridge. He
stated that the plaintiff's lights were not blinding him
(R. 236), that the plaintiff seemed to dim his lights,
and the truckdriver dimmed his (R. 240). He stated
that after he saw the Ford coming, as it got close to him
he didn't move over at all, and that he was over on his
extreme left side of the pavement. Thereupon counsel
for the defendant corrected him with the following language: ''You mean left side or right side¥'' To which he
answered, "West, or right" (R. 230). He said that he
did not feel a jolt from the impact; that the force of the
impact had no effect on his position in the truck. The
first indication of the impact he had was a terrible noise
just behind the driver's seat, and that he was too close to
the bridge at the time of the impact to see (R. 231) Heremembered the shoulder at the bridge to be approximately
two feet wide (R. 232). After the impact he remained constantly in the direction he was going until he pulled off
the road. All four wheels of the truck were on the hard
surface of the road for a distance of 275 feet after impact
before the truck was pulled off the highway (R. 234).
Officer Pearce had previously testified that he had talked
with the driver of the defendant's truck, and the driver
12
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had told him he thought he was on his side of the road;
that the driYer didn't ~tate it definitely (H. ~12-213).
\Yhl'll asked about this conYersation with Officer Pearce,
:Jlr. :Matheson stated that he did not recall it, although
he did not deny that the statement was made (R. 235).
Eridence Pertaining to Into.xication

Jack Scott testified on behalf of the defendant
that the plaintiff came to his place of business about 5:30
o'clock in the e\·ening on the day of the accident, and
was Ye1·y much intoxicated. The witness again, over the
objection of the plaintiff, was permitted to testify to an
incident which occurred in front of an adjoining store,
during the course of which the plaintiff was said to have
addressed another man thusly: ''Hi, Stupid'' and was
said to have made threatening gestures with a 22 rifle
which he was carrying at the time.
Another witness for the defendant, Robert Tuckett
testified that the plaintiff made threatening gestures
with the rifle after an exchange of unpleasant words
between the witness and the plaintiff R. 135).
Another witness for the defendant, Layron Christenson who was manager of a hardware store in
( ~edar City, testified that he saw the plaintiff around
5:30; that he was a little bit drunk, and wanted to sell the
witness a gun ( R. 137).
Another witness for the defendant, Kent T. Farnsworth, te~t ified that he was operating Ted's Bar
13
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the day of the accident, and that the plaintiff came
into the bar around 6:30 in the evening; that the plaintiff was unstable, although the witness figured he was all
right to be served a beer. However, the plaintiff tipped
the glass of beer over and the witness refused to serve
plaintiff any more beer, whereupon the plaintiff became
belligerent, and it was necessary for the witness to show
him to the door (R. 139). The appearance of the plaintiff
as he came into the beer parlor was that of a man who
had been drinking, but who was carrying himself well at
that time and he felt he could sell plaintiff a glass of
beer without violating the rules and without rendering
plaintiff drunk (R. 140-141).
Orissa Hirschi, an employee of the Circus Lounge,
another tavern in Cedar City, saw the plaintiff in
the Circus Lounge between 8 :00 and 8 :30 that evening.
She described the plaintiff as very insulting and quite
loud-mouthed (R. 143).
The plaintiff was removed from the Circus Lounge
by Police Officer William M. Hills, another witness,
who testified on behalf of the defendant. He took the
plaintiff for a ride in his car and engaged in a conversation with him (R. 150-154). He testified that if the plaintiff had been very drunk and causing trouble, he would
have arrested him, and would not have turned him loose
(R.157). He stated that the plaintiff was able to pull himself together in the tavern and walk reasonably straight,
having some trouble with his speech but that he was able
to carry on a reasonable, sensible conversation, and was14
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able to control himself fairly well (R. 158-160). The officer put the plaintiff in the plaintiff's car, but told him not
to driYe it, and left him alone in the car (R. 162).
High,Yay Patrolman Thomas H. Simmons called
on behalf of the plaintiff testified he could smell
the odor of alcohol on plaintiff's breath in the automobile a the scene of the accident (R. 304) and was of the
opinion that plaintiff was under the influence of liquor
R. 305).
Highway Patrolman Ernest Pearce called on behalf of the defendant testified that when he got
to the scene of the accident, plaintiff was profaning and
in a belligerent state of mind; that he was of the opinion
that plaintiff was intoxicated. He did not know there
was a gash on his temple at that time. He observed that
the arm was very badly mangled, and in terrible condition, but did not observe the condition of the plaintiff's
leg (R. 205-206). There ·was much blood on the floor of
the car, plaintiff appearing to have lost a great deal of
blood, and plaintiff was objecting to the fact that a
doctor hadn't come. He appeared to be impatient about
the fact a doctor hadn't come and the ·officer regarded
that as an unusual thing (R. 207). When asked by counsel for the plaintiff if he could tell with any degree of
certainty whether the plaintiff was under the influence of
liquor, the officer stated that he couldn't answer that
question "yes" or "no" (R. 208).
The driver of the defendant's truck, testifying on behalf of the defendant relative to intoxication, stated that
15
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he held the plaintiff's head, and was very close to him,
but that he did not notice the smell of liquor on his breath,
and did not know whether the plaintiff had been drinking or not (Exhibit M).
Doctor L. V. Broadbent of Cedar City, testifying
on behalf of the defendant, stated that during the
course of treatment at the hospital, the plaintiff used
abusive language and was very antagonistic and objected
strenuously to anything he attempted to do, although the
plaintiff later apologized to him for his behavior on the
following morning (R. 289-280). The doctor stated that
he was of the opinion that plaintiff was intoxicated (R.
291). However, on cross examination he stated that the
patient when he saw him at 11:30 in the evening had a
rapid thready pulse which indicated shock, and that
when a person is under shock he is usually very depressent, that is, slow to respond (R. 292); that he was in a
profound degree of shock from acute blood loss; that his
arm was dangling by a piece of muscle only, there being
no bone connection on the arm at all, and most of the
fleshy portion had been severed. He was not prepared to
say that the plaintiff was definitely under the influence of
intoxicating liquor (R. 293). That in a measure, the symptoms presented by plaintiff could be explained by the
severe shock. Through the course of the night he had been
given numerous drugs and sedatives. Being reminded of
his previous deposition, the doctor acknowledged that he
testified under oath previously that he didn't see evidence
of intoxication, and couldn't say that the plaintiff had
consumed alcoholic beverage prior to the time he saw
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him, ( R. ~95). Then over the objection of plaintiff, the
doctor was permitted to giYe repetitious testimony about
the very belligerent, obstreperous behavior of the plaintiff, and about his use of profane language (R. 297 -298).
Phyllis X elson, a nurse on duty in the hospital,
testifying on behalf of the defendant relative to intoxication, stated that she noticed the smell of liquor on
the plaintiff's breath, (R. 352). Over the objection of
the plaintiff, the witness was asked to testify about the
language the plaintiff used in the hospital, and she stated
that he was profane, belligerent, and uncooperative in
every way (R. 353). She was of the opinion that plaintiff
was under the influence of liquor (R. 354). Again, over
the objection of plaintiff, the witness was permitted to
testify repetitiously that the plaintiff used abusive language and was hard to handle (R. 354).

STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH
APPELLANT RELIES
Point I. There was insufficient evidence of intoxica..,
tion of the plaintiff at the time of the collision to
warrant the submission of that issue to the jury,
and there was no evidence that intoxication was a
proximate or contrilntfing cause of the collision.
Point II. The plaintiff was entitled to have his case submitted to the jury upon the theory of his evidence as
well as upon the theory of the whole evidence.
Point III. The plaintiff 1cas deprived of a fair and impartial trial by the i1nproper admission of evidence
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that was calculated to inflame and confuse the jury,
and stifle their minds with prejudice and hatred
toward the plaintiff.
Point IV. The court erred ~n failing to grant Plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
ARGUMENT

Point I. There was insufficient evidence of intoxication of the plaintiff at the time of the collision to
warrant the submission of that issue to the jury,
and there was no evidence that intoxication was a
proximate or contributing cause of the collision.
In this case, the ultimate question to be decided by
the jury was whether the truck overlapped the center of
the road at the narrow bridge and thereby caused the
collision. This question was clouded and subordinated in
the minds of the jury by testimony on the intoxication of the plaintiff several hours prior to the
accident. The witness Jack Scott testified that at 5 :00
o'clock on the day of the accident the plaintiff came in to
his place of business very much intoxicated. One half
hour later, the plaintiff went to the hardware store,
managed by the witness Layron Christensen, for the purpose of selling his 22 rifle. Mr. Christenson said that the
plaintiff was a little bit drunk at that time (R. 137). An
hour later, about 6:30, the plaintiff was said to have gone
into Ted's Bar where the witness Farnsworth thought he
was all right to be served another beer, but when he observed the plaintiff tipped the glass of beer over he didn't
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serve him any more beer. He said that the plaintiff became belligerent, and that it was necessary for him to
show plaintiff to the door, (R.. 139). He testified that the
appearance of the plaintiff was that of a man who had
been drinking, but who ·was carrying it well at the time,
and that he could sell him a glass of beer without violating
the rules and without rendering the plaintiff drunk (R..
140-141.) The witness Orissa Hirschi, an employee of
the Circus Lounge in Cedar City, Utah saw the plaintiff
between 8 :00 and 8 :30. She sold him no beer and he was
escorted from the lounge by the police officer. He had
been very insulting and quite loud-mouthed. She stated
that the plaintiff carried himself well after the officer
arrived (R.. 146). The last witness to have any personal
contact with the plaintiff prior to the collision was the
police officer William 1\I. Hills of Cedar City, who went to
the Circus Lounge where he saw the plaintiff, and he said
that the plaintiff had the appearance of being intoxicated. He conducted the plaintiff from the tavern, and
the plaintiff walked fairly straight until they got to the
foot of the stairs where he was quite wobbly, and the officer took hold of his arm; however he stated that as an
officer in Cedar City, if a man was very drunk and causing
trouble, he would arrest him and not turn him loose again;
that he took the plaintiff for a ride during which the
plaintiff engaged in an intelligent conversation. He
stated that although the plaintiff was having some trouble
with his speech, he was able to carry on a reasonably
sensible conversation (R.. 158-159), and was able to control himself fairly well (R.. 160). The officer put the
19
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plaintiff in his car, rather than arresting him, and told
him not to drive it and left him alone in the car at about
8:45 (Exhibit 1). There is some testimony to the effect
that the plaintiff was intoxicated at the scene of the accident, but it must be remembered in this connection that
the plaintiff had sustained a severe blow to his temple
with a laceration of the head which required suturing
(R. 18), and Dr. Milligan considered him to have sustained a concussion of the brain. Plaintiff's left arm was
hanging by a ribbon of muscle and he had sustained shattering fractures of the left leg, which later required amputation. Before the tourniquet had been applied to the
plaintiff's arm he had lost a great deal of blood. He was
at the scene an hour to an hour and a half before medical
aid arrived. Officer Pearce based his testimony that the
plaintiff was under the influence of liquor at the scene of
the accident upon two things : First, that he had the odor
of alcohol on his breath, and second that he was profaning
and in a belligerent state of mind. He stated that the
plaintiff was objecting to the fact that a doctor hadn't
come, and appeared to be impatient, and he regarded that
as an unusual thing (R. 207). When asked by counsel if
he could tell with any degree of certainty whether the
plaintiff was under the influence of liquor, the officer
stated that he couldn't answer that question "yes" or
"no" (R. 208). The driver of the defendant's truck,
LaMar W. Matheson, testifying on behalf of the defendant stated that although he held the plaintiff's head and
was very close to him the witness did not notice the smell
of liquor on the plaintiff's breath and did not know
20
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whether the plaintiff had been drinking or not (Exhibit
:M). William C. Dalton, another \Yitness called on behalf
of the defendant, who was present at the scene of the accident, gaYe no evidence relatiYe to the intoxication of the
plaintiff. ~-\.rthur X el~on, Sheriff of Iron County, who was
present and participate~ in the investigation of the accident gave no testimony relatiYe to the intoxication of the
plaintiff. Thomas H. Simmons, highway patrolman who
likewise was present and investigated the accident, testified that he was of the opinion that the plaintiff was
under the influence of liquor, and he could smell the odor
of alcohol on plaintiff's breath in the automobile (R. 304305). On the other hand, Theodore Atherly testified in rebuttal that he '''ent over to the car where Howard Watkins
was lying four or five times, and there was nothing about
his appearance that indicated he was under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. Considering the severity of the
plaintiff's injuries, the large quantity of blood he had
lost, the blow on the head, with the resulting concussion,
together with the fact that he was at the scene of the
accident for over an hour before medical help arrived, we do not think that his protesting against the
delay in the arrival of doctors could reasonably be taken
by anyone as indication of insobriety. Certainly there
was no plausible evidence of any kind, other than the odor
of alcohol on the plaintiff's breath, which could provide a
basis for the opinions expressed by the two highway
patrolmen at the scene of the accident, and one of these
officers as pointed out admitted that he could not say
with any degree of certainty that the plaintiff was under
the influence of liquor at the scene of the accident.
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In the case of Flemming vs. McMillan, West Virginia
26 S.E. 2d 8 appears the following:
''The evidence with respect to the intoxication
of defendant at the time of the accident in which
Ada Flemming lost her life is not persuasive. It is
true that all the witnesses stated that the defendant had the odor of liquor on his breath at the time
and place where the body of Ada Flemming was
found. The witnesses were law enforcement officers, one being a constable and the other a state
policeman. These officers did not arrest the defendant and apparently they had no reason to do
so. The constable testified that at some time prior
to the accident he could smell alcoholic liquor on
the defendant's breath, and that he kept repeating
words, but the same witness testified that at the
place of the accident on Route 50, defendant still
retained the odor of intoxicating liquor, but that
he, the constable, observed nothing unusual in conversation or conduct of the defendant. The other
officer observed nothing unusual on the part of the
defendant at that time and place. The evidence as
to intoxication of defendant fails in that it does
not appear that his indulgence in the use of such
was the proximate cause of the tragedy."
Another case in point is that of State vs. Johnson
76 Utah 84 287 P. 909. In that case, which was a manslaughter case, there was evidence that five people in the
evening were walking across the intersection of 4th South
and 2nd East, Salt Lake City, crossing from the south to
the north on the east side of 2nd East, and had reached
a point approximately 15 feet from the north curb line of
4th South when an automobile headed east and driving on
the north side of the street at 40 miles per hour crashed
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into the group, killing two of the persons, and wounding
another. A baby was being carried in the arms of its mother
at the time of the accident. This baby was hurdled from
its mother's arms through the windshield of the car and
into the driYer's seat, and carried away. The car did not
stop or eYen slacken its speed on account of the accident.
The baby was later found at the home of the defendant,
to which place it had been carried by him in the automobile which he had been driving. Defendant did not
report the accident to the police station nor take the
baby, which was bleeding and dying, either to the station
or emergency hospital or to any public place, but took it
to his home. The defendant's father called the chief of
police who went to the defendant's home about 10:00
o'clock and testified that he asked the defendant about
the accident, but that the defendant didn't seem to know
a great deal about it at the time; and that when he asked
the defendant about the accident and where the trouble
had happened, the defendant simply shook his head and
did not seem to want to talk very much, and was very
much excited. The officer stated that he noted a considerable odor of liquor on the defendant's breath. The foregoing facts appear in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Folland, page 107 and 108 of the Utah Reports. At the
conclusion of the evidence, the defendant requested the
court to withhold from the jury the charge that he was
under the influence of liquor on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to support such charge. The request was
refused and the charge with the other alleged unlawful
acts submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict of
guilty of involuntary manslaughter. The court held that

23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the evidence was insufficient to warrant the submission of
the issue of intoxication to the jury. 'Ve quote from the
decision, commencing at the middle of page 89 of the
Utah Reports :
"
. In addition to the testimony that the
chief of police, more than three hours after the
accident, on going near the defendant in his house
to get, as he testified, a 'whiff' of the defendant's
breath and observed' a considerable odor of liquor
on his breath,' the other matters so pointed to in
support of the ruling and to show that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor
consist of the evidence, though in conflict, that the
defendant just before the accident drove the car
against a red light, drove it on the wrong side of
the street, drove it at an excessive speed, and
operated it against others at a street crossing.
Though there was sufficient evidence to show that
the defendant committed some or all of such alleged unlawful acts charged in the information, it
does not relevantly or probatively follow that he
was guilty of the alleged unlawful act of driving
the car while he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In other words, driving an automobile in violation of traffic rules or ordinances in
one or more particulars, or driving negligently or
even recklessly, resulting in an accident, does not
relevantly tend to prove the driver was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. There is no probative relation of the one to the other. It may not
be doubted that many 'as sober as a judge' and as
often have driven automobiles against red lights,
frequently violated the speed limit, or otherwise
violated traffic rules and met with or caused accident through such violations or negligent driving.
To characterize such acts as relevantly tending to
show intoxication is to characterize a large percent
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of automobile driYers as being intoxicated or
under the influence of intoxicating liquors while
operating automobiles. General rules governing
probatiYe effects of evidence should not be disregarded or prostrated to suit emergencies of a
particular case.
''It further in effect is observed that though
the evidence be regarded as insufficient to show
that the defendant was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, still he was not prejudiced because such issue was admitted to the jury for the
reason that there was ample evidence to sustain
the conYiction of the other unlawful alleged acts.
The question presented is not one of sufficiency of
evidence to justify the verdict or judgment. No
such complaint is made. The question presented
is as to whether error was committed in submitting to the jury a material issue upon which it
is claimed there was insufficient evidence to support it, and if so whether the error was prejudicial.
If in a civil case \vhere several acts of negligence
are charged, each constituting actionable negligence, and the evidence is insufficient as to one of
such acts, but against objections nevertheless is
submitted to the jury and a general verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff, hardly anyone would
contend that no prejudice resulted on the ground
that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict on the other alleged acts . . . Letting all the
issues as to all of the alleged unlawful acts go to
the jury gave them to understand that they could
render a verdict of guilty on any one or all of them
which was required to 'be expressed only by a general verdict. Some of the jurors may have been induced to join in the verdict on one or more of the
alleged acts, some on other alleged acts but on
which or on all it is impossible to tell. That none
of the jury was induced to join in the verdict be-
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case of the submission of the issue as to intoxication is also impossible to tell. We cannot review a
criminal action like an equity case-try it de novo
on the record-and ourselves determine the guilt
or innocence of the defendant, the weight to be
given conflicting evidence, the credibility of the
witness, or the weight or credit to be given the
claim or testimony of the defendant. Though the
evidence may amply or satisfactorily sustain the
conviction, yet it is not within our province to
determine the guilt of the defendant and in such
case justify erroneous and adverse rulings against
him nonprejudicial. That is to say, if on the
record we think a defendant guilty or ought to
have been convicted, we may not regard any kind
of a trial good enough for him (italics ours). We
thus think the ruling not only erroneous, but also
prejudicial. Its very nature had a tendency and
was calculated to do harm, and on the record we
cannot say it did no harm or did not influence the
verdict. The test of determining prejudicial error
is stated in Jensen v. Utah Railway Co. (Utah)
270 P. 349."
See also Rogers vs. Silverfleet System of Memphis,
(Louisiana) 180 S. 445 from which we take the following
quotation:
But before discussing this physical evidence,
we will make the observation that from a careful
study of the evidence we do not think that Rogers
was drinking or that he was under the influence of
intoxicating liquors to the extent that his ability
to drive the truck was affected. Without analyzing the voluminous testimony on this point, two
factors would suffice to justify this conclusion:
first the fact that defendant's own witness Bill
Badgett did not testify that Rogers was drunk,
notwithstanding the fact that Badgett and 1\1:angle
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were in a better position to know whether· or not
Rogers was under the influence of liquor than anyone else, and second if Rogers had been drinking
befor he left Brookhaven, or drunk before leaving
there, some four or five hours had elapsed before
the accident, and it is not probable that he would
have then been under the influence of liquor ... "
In the case at bar, there was no substantial evidence
other than the odor of alcohol on the plaintiff's breath
at the scene of the accident that indicated intoxication,
and the evidence of the defendant, who had the burden
of establishing intoxication, was to the effect that intoxication could not have been determined with any degree
of certainty. The two cases just cited are authority to the
effect that the odor of liquor alone on the breath of the
plaintiff is not sufficient evidence to warrant submission
of the issue to the jury. It is significant that the driver
of the defendant's truck, LaMar W. Matheson, testifying on behalf of the defendant stated that he first saw the
plaintiff's car about two miles away and that it appeared
to be coming in a normal manner and there was no evidence or indication that the Ford was weaving at all on
the highway, but that it was coming straight (R. 228).
That he actually dimmed his lights and the other driver's
lights were not blinding him, and the other car seemed to
dim its lights (R. 236 and 240). He testified that just a
moment before the impact the Ford actually did turn toward him (R. 229). This corroborates the testimony of
the plaintiff to the effect that the truck was overlapping
the center, and he had to get onto the shoulder, and when
the bridge came into view, he had to turn toward the
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truck in an attempt to squeeze between the truck and the
bridge. To demonstrate the sobriety of his judgment, if
the truck had moved towards its side of the road another
six inches, there would have been no accident. Confronted
with the alternative of hitting the wash which was deep
enough to bury his car, or of hitting the concrete abutment which promised certain death, or of attempting to
squeeze through between the bridge and the centeroverlapping truck, the plaintiff certainly took the most
reasonable alternative. It seems incredibly unreasonable on the part of the trJ.Ick driver to maintain his bullheaded straightforward course down the middle of the
highway without yielding one inch to the plaintiff. A reasonable and altogether sober man in plaintiff's predicament certainly would have been justified in entertaining
the hope that the truck would yield sufficiently to plaintiff's side of the road to permit him to pass through. Taking all the evidence as a whole, the proximate cause was
the failure of the defendant's truck driver to alter his
middle-of-the-road course a few inches to the right in
order to permit the plaintiff to pass on the narrow bridge.
Again the witness Glen C. Garfield, who also testified on behalf of the defendant and who was a passenger
in the defendant's truck, stated that when he saw the car
approaching it was in the distance (R. 185), and the last
time he saw the car it was a quarter of a mile away, and
as the plaintiff's car approached, it did so in a normal
manner, except for the relative apparent speed (R. 186187). He stated that the plaintiff's car was probably
traveling with its lights on dim when he last observed it
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(R. 189). We fail to perceive how it can reasonably be
eontended that planitiff was driving his ear under the
influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the impact
when the two eye witnesses to the accident, who testified
on behalf of the defendant, stated that he operated his
vehicle in a normal manner. It is also significant that
without any proof of any intervening drinking on the
part of the plaintiff, approximately five hours had
elapsed since the witness who managed the hardware
store testified that he appeared to be a little drunk
(R. 270). There is no substantial conflict in the physical
evidence. The point of impact was just north of the
bridge according to the defendant's witness who was a
passenger in the truck, and although that witness asserted
that the truck was on its side of the road, nevertheless the
tire burns made by the plaintiff's automobile as it
established its contact with the truck about 10 feet north
of the bridge are still clearly visible in the photograph,
Exhibit G. The westernmost tire burn was located 4 feet
east of the center of the highway, according to Highway
Patrolman Pearce, Sheriff~ elson and Theodore Atherly;
and although the truck after impact was pulling off the
side of the road to stop, it left a tell-tale trail of raspberries which overlapped the center line for a distance of
approximately 60 feet after impact, and those raspberries
were falling from the left front corner of the truck. The
effect of this physical evidence showing defendant's undeniable encroachment on the plaintiff's side of the road
at the narrow bridge is not substantially disturbed by the
defendant's statement to Highway Patrolman Pearce that
he thought he was on his own side of the road. The physi29
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cal evidence corroborates the testimony of the plaintiff relative to the truck's position on his side of the road.
True, there was some testimony relative to gouges which
were thought to have been caused by the left front wheel
of the Ford when it struck the truck near the bridge, but
the physical evidence showed that the left tire was still on
the Ford as it laid its burns shown on Exhibit G, and that
tire was not thrown until just before the Ford made its
last crossing of the highway. This is definitely shown by
the continuous rim mark which appeared on that last turn
opposite the point where the tire was found. The witness Atherly testifying in rebuttal stated that he saw
some gouges but didn't think they were from the accident,
and there was nothing to indicate a connection between
the gouge and the tire burns which first appeared on the
highway (R. 362).
Instruction No.5, which the court gave the jury, read
as follows:
''You are instructed that it is a violation of the
law of this state for any person who is under the
influence of intoxicating liquor to be in actual
physical control of any motor vehicle. Under the
influence of intoxicating liquor means in such condition from the use of intoxicating liquor so as to
impair the person's ability to drive an automobile
in the manner that an ordinarily prudent and cautious person in full possession of his faculties
would operate a similar vehicle under like conditions.
''If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the plaintiff, while driving
his car immediately before and at the time of said
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accident, was under the influence of intoxicating
liquor as hereinbefore defined, then he was guilty
of negligence as a matter of law, and if you further
find from a preponderance of the evidence that
his condition was the sole or proximate contributing cause of the collision with defendant's truck,
then plaintiff cannot recover and your verdict
must be for the defendant.''
Plaintiff excepted to the court's Instruction No. 5 and
the whole thereof on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to show that the plaintiff was under the influence of liquor at the time of the accident in any extent
or to the extent that it affected his operation of his
vehicle. Plaintiff further excepted to the last paragraph
of Instruction No. 5 and the particularly the part thereof
which stated that plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a
matter of law for the reason that such instruction was
against the law and not applicable to the evidence (R.
368-369).
Plaintiff also excepted to the court's failure and
refusal to give Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 1
to the effect that they should disregard the evidence in the
case pertaining to the consumption of beer by the plaintiff as being immaterial.
We submit that the evidence being devoid of anything
tending to show that the plaintiff was under the influence
of liquor as he operated his vehicle immediately prior to
and at the time of impact, the court was not justified in
submitting that issue to the jury for their consideration.
The burden was upon the defendant to show as a matter
31
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of defense that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence through being under the influence of liquor,
and that such negligence contributed to or proximately
caused the accident. Certainly that burden was not discharged by the defendant when the two eye witnesses to
the accident, the defendant's truck driver and his passenger, both of whom were defendant's witnesses, testified that the plaintiff approached the scene of the collision in a normal manner. The defendant's truck driver
who testified for the defendant and who held the plaintiff's head in his lap, was in a better position perhaps than
anyone to determine whether he was under the influence
of liquor. He did not testify that Plaintiff was intoxicated, but on the contrary stated that he did not know
whether the plaintiff had been drinking or not. It is true
that Dr. L. V. Broadbent testifying on behalf of the defendant said that some two hours after the accident he
was of the opinion that the plaintiff was intoxicated. He
however admitted that when he saw the patient, he had
a rapid thready pulse which indicated a profound degree
of shock from acute blood loss; that his arm was dangling
by a piece of muscle only, and that he was not prepared
to say that the plaintiff was definitely under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. He admitted that in a measure the
symptoms presented by the plaintiff could be explained
by the severe shock and that during the course of the night
the plaintiff had been given numerous drugs and sedatives. The doctor, reminded of his previous deposition,
acknowledged that he testified under oath previously that
he didn't see evidence of intoxication, and couldn't say
that the plaintiff had consumed alcoholic beverage prior
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to the time he saw him (R. 295 ), nor should any weight
be giYen to the testimony of the nurse, Phyllis Nelson, who
was willing to state that she was of the opinion that the
plaintiff was intoxicated because there was the odor of
liquor upon the patient's breath.
"\Ve submit that the best evidence relative to the point
of impact appears on Exhibit G which shows that the tire
burns started very clearly on the plaintiff's side of the
highway near the narrow bridge, and this evidence was
Gorroborated by one of the highway patrolmen, Mr.
Pearce, and by the witness Atherly. Such evidence provides a convincing and conclusive answer and repudiation
of defendant's truck driver who told Officer Pearce that
he thought he was on his side of the road. Again the physical evidence clearly corroborates the testimony of the
plaintiff to the effect that the truck was overlapping the
center of the road and that when the lights were dimmed
of the two vehicles, and the bridge came into view, he
was presented with the alternative of either almost certain death by striking the wash or hitting the concrete
abutment, or taking the chance of squeezing through between the truck and the bridge hoping that the truck
would yield sufficiently to allow him to go through. The
plaintiff's version of the approach of the two vehicles to
the point of impact was further corroborated by the testimony of the defendant's truck driver to the effect that the
plaintiff's Ford turned toward him just a moment before
the impact. We submit that the decision made by the
plaintiff and the course which he took were the decision
and course of a sober man. The plaintiff's conduct seemed
33
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far more reasonable than that of the defendant's truck
driver who acknowledged that he maintained his heavily
loaded truck on an unaltered course, even after the plaintiff turned his vehicle toward him. Yet if the defendant's
truck driver had swerved his vehicle or moved it six more
inches to the right-and he had ample room to do it on the
highway-there would have been no collision. We feel
compelled to inquire, who acted the more reasonably under
the circumstances: the driver of the heavily loaded truck,
overlapping the center of the highway who refused to
alter the course of his vehicle one iota to make room at the
narrow bridge, or the plaintiff who took the only course
that justified a reasonable hope that the tragedy might
be averted. The vital matter for the jury to have determined in this case was not whether the plaintiff acted in
an unseemly manner in Cedar City in the early evening
preceding the accident, and failed to cooperate with the
doctor and the nurse hours after the accident in the hospital when they were cutting off his arm, sewing up his
head, and attempting to do something for a leg injured
beyond repair. Their clear duty was to determine from
the evidence this issue: Who encroached upon the other
man's side of the road at the narrow bridge. They were
not assisted in arriving at that ultimate truth by anything
other than the conduct of the operators of the two
vehicles involved immediately prior to and at the scene of
the collision, and by the physical evidence, most persuasive of which was the tire burn clearly shown on the
photograph, Exhibit G. The jury's minds were diverted
from these vital considerations by the invitation of the
court to find against the plaintiff, if they thought that
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the plaintiff was intoxicated and that his intoxication was
a proximate or contributing cause of the accident, without regard to the dearth of evidence in the record to sustain such a finding.

Point II. The plain-tiff was entitled to have his case submitted to the jury upon the theory of his evidence as
well as upon the theory of the whole evidence.
In this case, in its Instruction No. 5, the court submitted the issue of intoxication to the jury from the defendant's standpoint only. In the instruction, they were
told that if they found from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff while driving his car immediately
before and at the time of the accident was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, that he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law; and if they further found that
his condition was the sole cause or a proximate contributing cause of the collision with defendant's truck, then
plaintiff could not recover and their verdict must be for
the defendant. At no place in its instructions did the
court give the converse which would permit and instruct
the jury to disregard the evidence of intoxication if they
should find such intoxication was not a proximate or contributing cause of the accident. The plaintiff requested
the court to so instruct the jury in its requested instruction No. 3, which instruction the court refused (R. 408).
To this failure of the court, the plaintiff to an exception (R. 369). The principle involved in this point is a
familiar one to this court, .and it has made many pronouncements upon it.
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In the case of Morgan v. Bingham States Line Company 75 Utah 87, 283 P. 160, the court gave a general instruction on contributory negligence, as in the case at
bar, the court gave a general instruction on intoxicating
liquor. The defendant's request for a special instruction
on contributory negligence was refused. The court said at
page 105 of the Utah Reports:
"A party is entitled to have his case submitted to the jury on the theory of his evidence as
well as upon the theory of the whole evidence.
Toone v. O'Neill Const. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10:
Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 124 P. 522,
523, and Miller v. Utah Consol. M. Co. et al., 53
Utah 366, 178 P. 771; Pratt v. Utah Light and
Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868.
The following language of Mr. Justice Straup
in the case of Ha.rtley v. Salt Lake City, supra, is
peculiarly applicable here: '' 'There are two parties to a law suit. Each on a submission of the case
to the jury is entitled to a submission of it on his
theory and the law in respect thereof. The defendant's theory as to the cause of the accident is embodied in the proposed requests. There is some
evidence as we have shown to render them applicable to the case. That is not disputed. We think
the court's refusal to charge substantially as requested was error. That the ruling was prejudicial
and works a reversal of the judgment is selfevident and unavoidable.' " ...
While the requests are not models of accuracy,
we think the defendants were entitled to have at
least the substance of the same given so as to present their theory of the evidence to the jury, and
that a failure on the part of the court to do so was
prejudicial error.''
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The foregoing principle is reasserted in Webb v.
Suow 102 Utah 435 at page 448, Pratt v. Utah Light and
Traction Comp(J;ny 57 Utah 7 at Page 10.
We quote from Jlorrison v. Parry, 104 Utah 151, 140
P. 2d 77'2. at Page 162 Utah Reports:
Defendant's theory which was supported by
the evidence that the deceased, by driving on the
left-hand side of the highway and his failure to
turn to his right side in time to avoid creating an
emergency would create an emergency through no
fault of his. The court failed to properly separate
the theories of the parties but instead gave general
instructions treating the rights and the duties etc.''
The case of Metropolitan Life v. Adams, 37 Atlantic
2d 345 holds as follows :
"A party to a cause of action is entitled to
have his theory submitted to the jury where supported by the evidence and the pleading and this
makes it the duty of the court to submit all such
issues both affirmative and negative.''
It is stated in Bjork v. U.S. Bobbin and Shuttle Company, (NH) 111 Atlantic 284:

"While it has been held that if the jury are
instructed in general terms as to the law applicable to the case, failure to instruct upon request as
to the effect of particular evidence is not error, it
is now considered that the fairness of a trial requires that the judge shall inform the jury what
the law is in its application to the case when a
proper request is made.''
To the same effect are the following: .Jennings v.
Cooper, (Missouri) 230 SW 325; Hurt v. Jurczcht,
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(Illinois) 57 NE 2d 230; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company v. Shouse, (Florida) 91 South 90; 14 R.C.L.
Section 58, page 799; State v. McKay (Missouri) 30 SW"
2d 83; Equitable Life v. Green, (Kentucky) 83 SW 2d
478; Southern Pacific Company v. Stevens, (NM) 298
Pacific 661; Nonnamaker v. Kay County Gas Comparny,
(Okla.) 253 Pacific 296; Alexion v. Nockas, (Wash.) 17
P. 2d 911; .Jackson v. Farmers Union Livestock Commission, (Missouri) 181 SW 2d 211; Richards v. Parks,
(Tenn.) 93 SW 2d 639; Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Patterson, (Texas) 192 SW 2d 255; Slater v.
United Fuel Gas Company (West Virginia) 27 SE 2d 436;
Herstein v. Kemker, (Tenn.) 94 SW 2d 76 at page 88;
Yellow Cab Co. v. Sanders, (N. Carolina) 27 SE 2d 631.
Again there was evidence in this case on the part of
the truck driver and his passenger to the effect that the
truck pursued a straight course, and did not at any time
turn one iota to the right to make more room for plaintiff
at the narrow bridge. The defendant's duty to do so was
emphasized by plaintiff's theory that defendant was encroaching upon plaintiff's side of the road at the narrow
bridge. We therefore think that it was clearly error for
the court to refuse to give Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6 which was not otherwise covered by any instruction which the court gave. That instruction is as
follows:
You are hereby instructed that if you shall
find and believe from a preponderance of the evidence that as the vehicles involved in this accident
approached each other prior to the impact, the
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plaintiff's Yehicle turned to avoid striking the
bridge or the wash near the point of impact, and
in so doing the plaintiff acted reasonably and
exercised ordinary care under the circumstances,
and if you shall further find that the defendant
obserYed the plaintiff so alter the course of his
automobile, or if you shall find that in the exercise
of ordinary care the · defendant should have
seen the plaintiff so alter the course of his automobile, and if you shall further find that the
defendant had a reasonable opportunity thereafter
in the exercise of ordinary care to avoid colliding
with the plaintiff's automobile, by turning to the
right without endangering the safety of the occupants of defendant's truck, and if you shall find
that the defendant failed to avail itself of such opportunity, but continued straight ahead on an unaltered course, and that such conduct on the part
of the defendant was the proximate cause of the
accident, then you must find the issues in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, unless
you shall also find that the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence.
To the failure of the court to grant this requested instruction, the plaintiff duly excepted (R. 369).
There is ample evidence in the record to support
plaintiff's theory of the case as embodied in plaintiff's
Requested Instruction No. 6. There was evidence that the
defendant not only was encroaching upon plaintiff's side
of the road at the narrow bridge, but also that the defendant failed to move over, although he had plenty of room
and opportunity to do so.
That the court committed prejudicial error in refusing to give plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 3 and
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plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 6, is clearly established by the foregoing authorities.
Point III.

The plaintiff was deprived of a fair and im-

partial trial by the improper admission of evidence
that was calculated to inflame and confuse the jury,
and stifle their minds with prejudice and hatred
toward the plaintiff.

The record discloses that plaintiff was suffering
from a partial amnesia which disabled him from remembering any of the events which transpired in Cedar City
prior to the collision, as well as any events that occurred
at the hospital at Cedar City (R. 61-62-63, 76-77).
Dr. Milligan testifying on behalf of the plaintiff stated that plaintiff had sustained a concussion of the brain
(R. 27), as a result of the blow on his temple which had
been sutured. He stated that the blow to the head was
moderately severe (R. 18). He also stated that an injury
to the head can cause loss of memory for events immediately preceding the accident, and that any degree of
loss of memory is possible from a head injury; that the
head injury could cause loss of memory over a certain
period of time immediately preceding the injury except
for things that may have made an extremely strong impression (R. 21). The doctor further stated that it is
probable that plaintiff could remember events which
struck him forcefully, and would not remember events
that did not strike him forcefully; that shock could be of
sufficient degree to erase minor impressions in the brain
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and leaYe strong ones, or could be of sufficient severity
to erase them all (R. 26).
Over the objection of the plaintiff that the testimony sought to be elicited was remote, the court permitted the witness Jack Scott to testify concerning an
incident, wherein the plaintiff addressed a Mr. Tuckett
thusly: "Hi, Stupid" and made threatening gestures
with a 22 rifle to the witness Tuckett.
Again over the objection of plaintiff, Dr. L. V. Broadbent was permitted to give repetitious testimony about
the very belligerent, obstreperous behavior of the plaintiff, and about his use of profane language (R. 297-298).
Again over the objection of the plaintiff, the nurse,
Phyllis Nelson was permitted to testify that the plaintiff was profane, belligerent and uncooperative in every
way while he was being treated at the hospital after the
accident (R. 353). Again the witness was permitted to
state:
A.

Well, he didn't appreciate what was being
done for him, and he was using abusive language and it was hard for us to handle him.''

Counsel for the plaintiff moved that this statement be
stricken on the ground that it was repititious, and the
court permitted the answer to stand (R. 354).

It must be remembered in this connection that all the
evidence paraded before the jury by the defendant as to
the proceedings of the plaintiff in Cedar City prior to the
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time of the accident and, subsequently in the hospital
where he was undergoing treatment, was not, and could
not have been, disputed by the plaintiff by reason of his
loss of memory due to the blow on his head. The evidence
that plaintiff made threatening gestures, for instance,
with his gun to the alarm of the witnesses Tucket and Jack
Scott was not offered for the purpose of showing that he
was intoxicated, as Scott had already described his behavior at some length prior to that time, but such evidence was presented to the jury for the sole purpose of
inflaming their minds against the plaintiff. Again
testimony was elicited from the doctor and the nurse
while the plaintiff was being treated in the hospital, relative to his profaning and belligerency some two hours
after the accident had occurred, not for the purpose of
showing that the plaintiff was intoxicated, but for the
purpose of arousing the prejudice and hatred of the jury.
Considering the condition of the plaintiff in the hospital
with his arm hanging by a ribbon of muscle, a gash in his
temple, his l;>ody almost completely exsanguinated, his
right leg in a condition of rigor mortis and the patient
loaded with sedatives and on the verge of death, considering that he was finally brought to the hospital after
spending an hour to an hour and a half without medical
attention on the side of the road, within 7 miles of a town,
certainly, the plaintiff was entitled to be irritable. We
think it was going a long way for the court to permit the
matter of his profaning and his belligerency to be submitted to the jury, on the pretense that such showed intoxication, particularly after the doctor had testified that
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his behaYior could be attributed to the severity of his
injuries and his c-ondition of shock, and particularly after
the doctor had acknowledged that he had previously testified under oath that he could not say that the plaintiff
was intoxicated. "\Ve do not perceive in what manner the
threatening of a couple of businessmen in Cedar City
with a gun, if such thing actually did happen, at 5:30 in
the evening, could have any probative value to assist the
jury in determining whether the defendant's truck encroached upon the plaintiff's side of the road at the narrow bridge at 10:00 o'clock in the evening; nor can we
perceive how the matter of his profaning in the Cedar
City Hospital some two hours after the collision could
throw any light upon the issues which the jury were
called upon to determine. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that this testimony was calculated to arouse the
passion and hatred of the jury toward the plaintiff and to
render him despicable in their minds.
It is stated in 31 Corpus Juris Secondum, Page 877,
Section 166 that evidence which tends to prove facts which
are admitted or are not controverted will be more readily
excluded where if admitted it would probably prejudice
and mislead the jury.

Again in the case of Floyd v. Federal Union Casualty
Company, (Texas) 39 SW 2d 1091 at Page 1093 appears
the following:
"The fact of his leaving and the alleged cause
thereof was not evidence, and it would have been
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improper to have injected into the case sordid details to distract the attention of the jury which
should be concentrated on vital points and could
only have the effect of wasting the time of the
court. The court should refuse to permit its introduction, particularly when the testimony which is
challenged as irrelevant is such as to arouse the
sympathy of the jurors, or is calculated to create
prejudice-the point sought to be proved having
already been established-and is offered as being
merely corroborative. Stallings v. Rullman 79
(Texas) 421 15 SW 677 ; 2 Jones On Evidence,
Second Edition, Sec. 588, 22 Corpus Juris 169.''
In the case at bar the plaintiff was entitled to have the
jury pass upon matters which related to the incidents
which occurred at the narrow bridge on the Buckhorn
Flat at the time of the collision. The court should not
have permitted the juror's minds to be cluttered up, confused and corroded by the events related by the witness
Jack Scott and by the alleged profanity which occurred
in the hospital. To borrow the thought of Mr. Justice
Straup expressed in the Johnson case, supra, we should
not consider any kind of a trial good enough for
plaintiff, just because he had the odor- of liquor on his
breath.

Point IV. The court erred in fa.iling to grant Plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
That the court erred in denying plaintiff's motion
for a new trial is apparent from the discussion under the
previous points.
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CONCLUSION

We respectfully and earnestly conclude that by reason of matters set forth in this brief the plaintiff was deprived of a fair trial, and the judgment of the lower court
should be reversed.
WOODROW D. WHITE,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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